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Was Germany ever united? Given the historical circumstances of Germany’s unification in 
the 19
th century there is no obvious answer to this question. But such an answer can affect the 
prospects of the post-1989 unification process, and beyond this of European integration. We 
provide an econometric analysis of  Germany’s economic integration across various internal 
borders from the foundation of the Kaiserreich  until the end of the Weimar Republic. This 
analysis is based on a new comprehensive set of domestic trade flow data on railways and 
waterways, covering all parts of Germany 1885-1933. First, the disintegration effects by the 
separation of Alsace-Lorraine and Western Poland from Germany after the Versailles treaty 
were somewhat limited by previous disintegration of these regions. Second, while there is 
broad support for increasing integration across old political, administrative, and confessional 
borders between 1885 and 1933, a geographical divide between eastern and western parts of 
Germany had a persistent trade diverting effect well into the 1930s.  
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I. Introduction 
 
One of the main puzzles in international economics is how political and institutional 
borders affect the pattern of economic integration (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000). The formal 
removal of political borders by free trade agreements apparently affects trade patterns only to 
a very limited extend (see McCallum 1995, Engel and Rogers 1996 on the US-Canadian 
border). And even further  institutional  arrangements  such as the process of European 
integration seem to have surprisingly little effects on trade (Nitsch 2000). Evidence from the 
sudden political unification of Poland after WWI indicates that even 15 years after their 
removal the former partition borders had an average tariff-equivalent of about 20% on 
domestic trade flows across Poland (Wolf 2005). Similarly, the impact of currency unions on 
trade is heavily disputed (see Rose 2000, Glick and Rose 2002, Ritschl and Wolf 2005, 
Berger and Nitsch 2005). Why is it so difficult to change economic borders? 
 
A growing literature is trying to resolve this puzzle. A first line of research identified 
problems of specification and measurement error. Notably Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
showed that it is crucial to take location-specific unobserved heterogeneity, especially effects 
of “multilateral trade resistence” (like price level effects), into account. This reduces the 
border effects, but it does never eliminate them. Second, there is a large literature suggesting 
that administrative and political borders often coincide with the reach of various networks 
(Rauch 1996, Greif 1993). Combes et al. (2004) show that taking the trade-creating and trade-
diverting effects of social networks into account helps to reduce the effect of administrative 
borders in France on domestic trade flows by about a third. Similarly, biased development of 
infrastructure within administrative and political borders might increase the persistence of 
their effects (see Limao and Venables 2001).  But still, in all of these studies  a large, 
statistically and economically significant border effect remains unexplained.  A related 
literature following Alesina and Spolaore (2003) asks a more general question: what is the 
relationship between political and economic integration? Does political integration always 
foster economic integration as most authors in the border-literature apparently assume? Can 
we take it for granted that the shape of political borders is exogenous to economic relations? 
While this probably holds for the case of modern Africa (Herbst 2000), the same assumption 
is more demanding for Europe. Economic integration might well produce scope for political 
disintegration (see  Alesina and Spolaore 2003 for a theoretical argument) or the opposite,   4 
foster  political integration.  We need much  more  empirical work to understand these 
interactions.  
 
This paper looks into the case of Germany’s political unification from the late 19
th 
century onwards based on an extremely detailed set of domestic and cross-border trade flows. 
As noted by many students of European history, Germany is characterized by both, a high 
degree of internal fragmentation along various fault-lines but also by several dramatic 
changes to the shape of her borders. Given the availability of very detailed data on domestic 
trade flows, German history can provide new insights into the interaction between economic 
and political integration. The aim is to shed light on two related questions: how did economic 
integration evolve over time? And what was the effect of changing political borders on 
economic integration, compared to other lines of fragmentation (cultural, geographic)?  
 
To this end, we first sketch out in section II the historical background on Germany’s 
political fragmentation and the large historiographical literature on the problem of Germany’s 
political and economic unity. Section III describes a general theoretical framework to analyse 
the process of economic integration and possible effects of political, cultural, or other lines of 
fragmentation. In section IV we describe in detail the data, namely the relevant sources, 
characteristics and pitfalls of that data. Section V contains an empirical analysis, where we 
estimate the effect of various potential or obvious borders on the course of integration, and 
their changes over time. Section VI concludes.  
 
II. The long shadow of the Reich: Germany’s fragmentation in historical 
perspective 
 
Let us take the foundation of the German Empire, the “Kaiserreich”, in 1871 as a 
starting point to explore the economic unification of Germany. In order to analyze the degree 
of integration or fragmentation of this Kaiserreich and possible interactions between various 
internal borders we need some background knowledge about its origin. The aim of this section 
is first, to assess to what extend the shape of Germany in 1871 was due to exogenous political 
events, and to what extend it was the “endogenous” result of earlier processes. Related to this 
is the second aim: to derive hypotheses about potential fault-lines of internal fragmentation 
that can be expected when  we analyze the economic integration of  Germany from 1871 
onwards.    5 
 
It has often been stated that there was little necessary or unavoidable in the foundation 
of the Kaiserreich in 1871, that the shape of Germany in 1871 was largely the outcome of a 
series of historical accidents (e.g. Nipperdey 1993). Translated  into the parlance of 
economics, the unification of Germany in  her 1871 borders was the result of exogenous 
political events rather than the endogenous political consequence of earlier political or other 
processes. Contrary to this view, an older historiography in the tradition of Treitschke (1879) 
argued that the political unification of 1871  was the  teleological  endpoint of a long 
preparatory process. Among other factors like the early attempts to create a body of German 
law (Getz 1966), the German Zollverein of 1834 featured prominently as a precursor of the 
Empire (see Hamerow 1969). More recent work by economic historians sheds new light on 
this debate. According to Dumke’s seminal work (Dumke 1976) the  emergence of the 
Zollverein was largely driven by the struggle for political survival of the ruling elites. Small 
states usually had a very unfavourable ratio between territory and length of their outer 
borders, which could be improved by joining a customs union, and some of the small states 
were under growing pressure from parliamentary budget control. For example, when Electoral 
Hessia entered a customs union with Prussia in January 1832, this was in the very interest of 
the ruling Hessian elite because it raised new funds free of parliamentary control. Sure, as a 
by-product it also helped Prussia to bridge the gap between her western and eastern provinces 
and created incentives for others to follow. Also, the beginnings of railways in German states 
in the 1830s did not aim at the unification of Germany in the spirit of Friedrich List (1833), 
but sometimes even contributed to further disintegration. While List planned to connect the 
main cities and economic centres of Germany, in 1850 there was still no direct connection 
between Munich (Bavaria), Stuttgart (Württemberg), or Karlsruhe (Baden), but parallel north-
south lines. Similar, the important ports of Hamburg and Bremen were politically independent 
and hence not directly linked into the railway system of the Kingdom of Hanover (see 
Fremdling, Federspiel, and Kunz 1995). In the long run, however, each of these railway lines 
contributed to the economic integration of Germany. As Carol Shiue finds in a recent study on 
the Zollverein, the removal of customs borders between member states of the 1834 Zollverein 
to some extend helped to integrate grain markets between them (Shiue 2005).  
 
But even after the enlargement of the Zollverein in 1852/54, the political unification of 
this customs union was far from inevitable. The Zollverein did not work without conflict and 
internal crisis (Fischer 1972), the efforts to further unify German law stagnated in the early   6 
1860s (Stolleis 1992), and especially: still in 1865 there did not seem to be a political majority 
in favour of anything which would look like the Kaiserreich of 1871. Since the revolution of 
1848 the public was divided into partisans of a “großdeutsche Lösung”, which would have 
included the German parts of the Habsburg monarchy, partisans of a “kleindeutsche Lösung” 
under the lead of Prussia, and a group which feared a German national state altogether 
(mainly in the free cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Frankfurt). The German princes in turn 
struggled for their political survival, and in their majority fought against the solution of 1871 
in the war of 1866. What changed this situation and made political unification finally possible 
was not a slow, stepwise process of social and economic integration but the politics of the 
Prussian chancellor Bismarck towards a Prussian dominance over the minor German states at 
the cost of Habsburg.  
 
When the Kaiserreich was finally founded in January 1871, it was all but united. Let 
us shortly review the major internal fault-lines that ran across this Empire and some of their 
historical background. At least five of such internal borders can be identified, with many 
overlaps and interdependencies. First, the  Kaiserreich in 1871 was constitutionally a 
compromise between Prussian dominance and the attempt of the medium states to keep their 
autonomy. While the Prussian king became German Emperor, the Prussian prime minister the 
German chancellor, and Prussia covered the largest part of the new Empire, the central 
powers of the new Empire were weak. Important policy tools such as most parts of the 
administration, large parts of the law, or infrastructure policies (railways, canals, streets) 
remained at the state-level, which had a near-monopoly on direct taxes. Therefore, one can 
hypothesize that the old, historically inherited state borders continued to play their part within 
the new Empire.  
 
Second, Germany of 1871 was deeply divided by cultural differences; especially the 
divide between catholic and protestant regions, which  in turn  closely but not completely 
followed old political borders. This was rooted in the specific character of the Holy Roman 
Empire of the German Nation (the “Reich”) which existed from the Middle Ages through its 
dissolution in 1806.
2 While this Reich developed some characteristics of a state such like a 
central administration and legislative and judicative bodies especially from the late 15
th 
century onwards, the executive power of the central authority remained always very limited. It 
is not the aim of this paper to trace the origins of the central powers’ weakness (on this issue 
                                                 
2 The most comprehensive history of the Reich is still Karl Otmar von Aretin (1993-97), „Das Alte Reich 1648-
1806“, Stuttgart.    7 
see recently Volckart 2005). But starting with the religious conflicts in the 1530s and 
internationally sanctioned with the peace of Westphalia in 1648, modern state building in 
Germany took exclusively place below the level of the old medieval Reich. Importantly, while 
in France and England religion was linked to the crown, in the Reich the matter was left to the 
local  prices and cities. The Emperor – from 1438 onwards nearly always of the house of 
Habsburg - acted in this respect like a prince among other princes. A predominantly catholic 
Bavaria coexisted with a Lutheran Saxony and a Calvinist Palatinate within the Holy Roman 
Empire of the German Nation.  A special case was Prussia, which was predominantly 
protestant but gained after the Congress of Vienna the catholic Rhine and Ruhr areas. Due to a 
serious conflict between the central power and the protestants on the one hand side and the 
catholic church on the other during the late 1870s and 1887 (“Kulturkampf”) this internal 
border may well have been more visible in the 1880s than afterwards.  
 
A third potential fault-line which probably played a role in 1871 is a consequence not 
so much of history but rather of natural geography. The bulk of industrial developments in 
19
th century  Germany essentially c lustered around  some large cities (Berlin, Hamburg, 
Munich) and three regions of rich mineral resources, especially brown coal and hard coal. The 
first is the Rhine valley and all neighbouring regions, including the Ruhr area, connected by 
the Rhine and its tributaries. The second is the area between Halle and Zwickau in Saxony, 
the third is Upper Silesia. The latter two regions had natural waterway connections to Berlin 
via Elbe and Oder and to several sea ports. However, before the emergence of the railway and 
large scale construction of canals, the two eastern clusters were essentially unconnected to the 
western one. From 1847 onwards there existed a railway connection between Gleiwitz 
(Silesia) and Zwickau (Saxony), and also some indirect connection to the west. But it was still 
costly and cumbersome to transport mass commodities over larger distances for a long time. 
Before the First World War there was still no waterway connection between the industrial 
centres of  western Germany and the eastern industrial regions (Tipton 2003). In 1911, only 
7.9 % of all coal consumed in Berlin originated from the west, while 24.4% was British, and 
the rest originated either from Saxony or Silesia (Fremdling 2002, table 9).  We can 
hypothesize that due to the long absence of any direct connection for mass transportation 
between these areas, trade flows may show a geographical divide between east and west well 
into the 1920s.  
   8 
Forth,  against this geographical divide in east and west, the Zollverein  may have 
increased trade between its members. While the Zollverein  did by no means lead to the 
formation of the Kaiserreich, it obviously contributed to economic integration of its members 
(see Shiue 2005). Moreover, cooperation between early members of the Zollvereins tended to 
go beyond customs policy and involved aspects of monetary  integration (Holtfrerich 1989) 
but also i nfrastructure policies (Voigt 1965). Therefore we  can  ask, whether early 
membership continued to affect the degree of integration between them, or inversely, to what 
extend latecomers had difficulties to catch up to the integration of the core.  
 
Fifth and finally, when the Kaiserreich was formed in 1871, her borders were the 
outcome of the long struggle between Prussia, Habsburg, and concessions to the national 
activists. The Norddeutscher Bund, formed after the Prussian victory over Habsburg and 
allied troops at Königgrätz in 1866, included all German states north of the Main
3 but also all 
other Prussian territories  outside the German  with non-German majorities, especially the 
Polish East. After the victory of Prussia and her allies over French troops in late 1870, this 
Norddeutscher Bund was extended to include all other parts of the German Federation except 
the territories of Habsburg but now including the newly attained French provinces of Alsace 
and Lorraine. Hence, the Kaiserreich of 1871 included some territories with non-German 
speaking population majoritiy and a long history of affiliation with states outside of Germany. 
How evolved the integration of these territories into the new German state? In the following 
we will explore the process of Germany’s economic integration generally and to what extend 
this was affected by the mentioned five potential fault-lines.  
   
III. A theoretical framework to measuring fragmentation 
 
 Starting with the work of Hamilton and Winters (1992), Frankel and Wei (1993), and 
especially McCallum (1995), it has become a widespread approach to analyse the course of 
economic integration across political borders within the framework of a gravity model. This 
empirical model basically relates trade flows between two economic areas (regions, countries) 
to the importer’s demand, the exporter’s supply, and to the geographical distance between 
them. It is a helpful tool for explorative purposes since it usually fits the data very well while 
imposing only weak restrictions on the underlying economic structures. Several authors, 
                                                 
3 This is true with the exception of Luxemburg, which was subject of an international crisis in 1867 and granted 
neutrality.   9 
including Redding and Venables (2001), Eaton  and Kortum (2002), and most notably 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), have shown that it is possible to derive a gravity 
formulation from competing models of trade with equally tight microfoundations. Here I will 
follow  Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), since their model has by now become the new 
standard in the literature. 
 
  Let  Y k
i  be the value of production and  Ek
i the value of expenditure in area i for 
product k. Assume that the allocation of production and consumption within a country 
} , { E Y k
i
k
i  is separable from the allocation of trade across countries (see Anderson and van 
Wincoop 2004). Moreover, assume that all produced varieties are aggregated by a CES-
aggregator, and that all trade costs are proportional to the quantity of trade. Let us define  X
k
ij 
as the value of exports from area i to j in product k. A CES-demand structure implies 
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price charged by i for exports to j and P
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j is the CES price index: 
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Since we assume trade costs to be proportional to trade, the price p
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i is the (“f.o.b.”) supply price received by producers in area i and t
k
ij is the mark-up 
over that price that is associated with trade costs. We will later allow for some modification of 
the relation between transport costs and trade volume. Trade costs are our variable of interest 
and equals one plus the tariff equivalent of trade barriers.  
  Imposing for all i and all k the market clearing conditions  
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yields the gravity model, namely 
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where Y
k is the total output in sector k and I assume that trade costs are symmetric (tij = tji). 




i can be solved as a function of the set  } , { E Y k
i
k
i  and the trade 
barriers t
k
ij. Hence, given that trade flows and the set of production and consumption patterns 
can be identified, this structure allows estimating the effect of all kind of trade barriers. For   10 
example, given that two regions are separated by a political border involving direct (tariffs) or 
indirect (waiting times) costs to cross that border, the model allows us to estimate the effect of 
these costs on the volume of bilateral shipments.  
 
  The approach is especially suited for applications to historical data, because it is very 
undemanding in terms of data.  There are several ways to estimate the theoretical gravity 
equation (4). First, one can use non-linear least squares to estimate the structural equation 
under the restrictions imposed by the functional forms of the price-indices (Anderson and van 
Wincoop 2003). Alternatively, one can use data on price-levels, production, and consumption 
and estimate with OLS, as done in Baier and Bergstrand (2001) or Head and Mayer (2000). 
However, this kind of data is often unavailable, and even more so in a historical context. 
Therefore, we will choose a third approach that has become common in the most recent 
literature, as it delivers unbiased estimates of trade costs with minimal data requirements (see 
Anderson and van Wincoop 2003 and 2004, Eaton and Kortum 2002, Hummels 2001). This 
approach is to take logs of (4) and replace the price-indices and production and consumption 
variables with a set of area- and time-specific dummies. The equation to be estimated is then 
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Hence, we include a set of time-specific importer dummies, one for each area, which 
take on the value of one whenever that area enters the panel as an importer. The same holds 
for a set of exporter dummies. These dummies have the advantage to take not only difference 
in local purchasing power and production into account but all variation that is specific for a 
location but not for a bilateral pairing of locations. This can include the character of some 
location as a seaport, or place for cabotage, as well as the endowment of a location with 
mineral or other immobile resources.  
 
Moreover, the model can be easily extended to account for data that is given in metric 
tons instead of values, which is often the case with historical sources on domestic trade (see 
Wolf 2005). In this case we are dealing with 







ij = , 
where Z
k
ij is the volume of exports in metric quantities (tons). To estimate the model one has 
to adjust (5) for this special nature of the data and estimate   11 
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Note that in absence of value data it is crucial to have data which is highly disaggregated in 
terms of commodity groups in order to avoid aggregation bias.  
 
  In principle, the model allows assessing degrees of economic integration simply by 
regarding the structure of estimated residuals, i.e. without any ex ante assumption about the 
existence of barriers to trade. Large negative residuals – measured against the standard error 
of the regression - indicate that the observed bilateral trade flow is smaller than predicted by 
the model, i.e. given distance, and location-specific characteristics. Vice versa, large positive 
residuals indicate well integrated regions. This method delivers a very general picture of the 
pattern of economic integration. However,  in order to explain an observed pattern of 
economic integration one needs to make some assumptions about the nature of “trade costs” 
or the fragmentation of trade flows. As usual in the literature, let us assume that trade costs 
are a function of transport costs that increase in distance between locations by some exponent 
(which is to be estimated), and the costs associated with crossing a border (see Hummels 
2001): 






ij border dist t b b = , 
where borderij is a dummy variable defined as 
 
        1 if areas i, j are separated by at least one internal border, 
       
0 else.  
 
A negative and significant coefficient ß2 on such a dummy would give evidence of a trade 
diverting effect of internal borders on domestic trade flows.  
 
In the empirical section we will explore the effects of the five above mentioned 
internal borders where we expect some persistent effect of domestic trade in the Kaiserreich. 
Four of them (administrative borders, east-west divide, early Zollverein-membership, ethnic 
divides) can be constructed as simple dummies according to (9). Confessional differences, 
however, which may have exerted an impact on trade flows  especially during the 
“Kulturkampf”-period, do not follow too closely administrative borders. For example, while a 
(9)   borderij =   12 
Bavarian majority is catholic, within Bavaria there are both protestant and catholic regions. 
To take this into account, we construct a variable confessional difference, which divides the 
German population into two groups (Catholics, Non-Catholics) and is bilaterally defined as 
(10)      ) ( share Catholic Non share Catholic Non abs confdiff j i ij - - - - - = , 
where (Non-Catholic-share)i is the percentage share of non-Catholics in the total population 
of area i according to the census of 1885. We take the absolute value of bilateral differences 
between areas to proxy for the existence of religious differences across Germany.  
 
IV. The Data: sources, characteristics, problems 
 
  Our analysis of Germany’s economic integration is based on a large and newly 
compiled dataset on domestic trade flows between all parts of the Kaisserreich in her 1871 
borders, including trade with neighbouring foreign regions. The data is disaggregated for 
trade on railways and waterways and for about 200 groups of commodities and was published 
from 1885 onwards annually.  The fact that this kind of detailed data is available might 
surprise, and is due to rather special historical circumstances.  
 
  Usually historical data on trade flows exists only for those trade flows that cross a 
tariff border, just because the collection of tariff information was the very motivation to 
collect trade data. Due to the Zollverein, the information on trade flows between the future 
member states of the Kaisserreich before 1871 is rather sparse. But growing conflict about the 
distribution of tariff incomes raised the necessity to collect some statistical information in the 
1860s.  Some parliamentary commission  was installed, but  little  else  happened (see 
“Einführung” in Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, 1891). Only the heated debate about the 
traffic policy within the new German state, especially the question about the role of railways 
as opposed to canals and waterways, gave birth to a statistic of Germany’s domestic trade 
flows. In 1883 the Prussian Royal Statistical Office published the first volume of a statistic of 
domestic trade flows on railways,  which contained the complete matrix of bilateral flows 
disaggregated for various groups of g oods and 36 domestic and 15 foreign traffic districts. 
First it was published monthly, then on a quarterly base. From 1885 onwards this statistic was 
published annually, which makes the mass of contained information usable. It took some 
more time to develop a truly comparable statistic on trade flows on waterways (rivers, lakes, 
and canals). The first volume of this statistic appeared just before the outbreak of the First 
World War for 1913, published by the Federal Statistical Office (which since 1907 also   13 
published the railway statistics).  After the War, the statistic was continued, while under 
varying titles, in a way comparable to the earlier years. The Federal Republic of Germany also 
continued the statistic, first only for the territory of the FRG, from 1994 onwards 
systematically extended to include again the regions of the former GDR. Hence, there is an 
extremely detailed source to explore the course of Germany’s economic integration from the 
19
th century onwards well into our days.  
 
Let us consider  some details about the data with respect to the geographical 
disaggregation and the grouping of goods. In the 1883 statistic, the Kaiserreich was split into 
36 domestic trade districts, which closely followed the old administrative borders of the 
member states, but already aggregated some of the very minor ones (e.g. the many small 
administrative units in Thuringia were aggregated into Thüringische Staaten). In most cases 
the borders of these districts followed the state borders (e.g. Bavaria, or Alsace, and Lorraine), 
or respectively the provincial borders of Prussia. Due to several adjustments of the shape of 
these districts over time – some districts were split like Bavaria into two, some minor ones 
were grouped together with others like Leipzig city into Saxony -, we need to consolidate the 
districts over time. This gives a total 21 domestic and further 13 foreign consolidated trade 
districts (CTDs). Map 1 shows the consolidated domestic trade districts for the period 1883-
1913. We see that the district borders allow us to follow the five mentioned potential fault-
lines of internal fragmentation over time.  
 
After the Great War, the statistic was continued and this in a way not totally free of a 
revisionist perspective. Alsace and Lorraine were still accounted for, but there old systematic 
numbers of the domestic districts were replaced with new systematic numbers of the foreign 
districts. Similarly, the now Polish regions of Westprussia and Posen were aggregated into a 
district called “Westpolen (alle ehemaligen deutschen Gebiete)”, given a new number, but 
kept in the statistic. Fortunately from the researchers point for view, this allows us to analyze 
the effects of new political borders on trade flows. Some other territorial changes however, 
are more difficult to take into account, because the new borders split old traffic districts in a 
way that the matrix of trade relations between them and all others before and after the war are 
not fully comparable. This is the case for Upper Silesia, where the most heavily industrialized 
parts went to Poland after the public vote of 1921, and Schleswig, where the northern part was 
after 1919 returned to the state of Denmark. Map 2 gives the consolidated traffic districts for   14 
the situation after 1921. Given the mentioned exceptions, most districts are identical with the 
pre-war districts.  
 
The disaggregation of the data into groups of goods was very high and closely 
followed the German statistical system as applied in the foreign trade statistics, but it also 
varied over time. For example, hard coal was sometimes disaggregated into raw coal, cokes, 
and briquets, sometimes not. There are only minor changes over time, but again, some 
consolidation of the data was necessary to ensure comparability. Due to the fact, that the data 
is given in metric tons and not in transported values, we have to apply our econometric model 
version (7) and analyze them separately. In the following, we will explore trade flows for only 
6 selected groups of commodities (some of them aggregated from several others), which 
account for more than 50% of the total transported volume. These groups are 
-  Hard coals 
-  Brown coals 
-  Chemical products 
-  Rye 
-  Iron and processed Steel 
-  Paper and related products.  
We analyze the complete matrix of bilateral trade flows for these 6 groups based on  the 
consolidated trade districts (see Maps 1 and 2) for the years 1885, 1913, 1925, and 1933, and 
for the two modes of transport, railways and waterways. For a total of 34 CTDs and due to the 
fact that trade on waterways is not available for 1885, we have a total of 48.552 observations, 
obviously with many zero-observations and several missings for trade with foreign CDTs. In 
the next section we will estimate the econometric model of (7) based on the described data 
and search for the impact of the five potential fault-lines of internal fragmentation as 
described in the historical section. 
 
 
V. Was Germany ever united? First Results for 1885 – 1933 
 
  We estimate model (7) with Tobit to account for the many zero-observations in the 
data, and we allow for heteroskedasticity across our panel because local shocks probably did 
not travel uniformly. The main results are contained in five Tables; historical results in tables 
1-4, modern results in table 5. Table 1 starts with analysing trade flows both within and across   15 
the borders of the Kaiserreich (borders of 1871-1914). Table 2 proceeds to the analysis of 
trade flows within the German borders, where some additional information, e.g. on 
differences about the ethnic and religious composition of the population are used. Table 3 
uses the disaggegated trade data for commodity groups within the borders of the Kaiserreich. 
Table 4 in turn looks at the historical experience within the borders of Germany today, i.e. the 
borders of October 1990. 
 
  Consider table 1. The overall fit of the model is good but not excellent for a gravity 
model. However, the coefficients are highly significant and all have the expected signs, 
except early membership in the Zollverein of 1834, which has no significant effect based on 
the larger trade sample. The outer borders of the Kaiserreich are highly trade diverting, and 
increasingly so. And there are massive internal borders. If we neglect the effects of a varying 
elasticity of substitution, trade within Prussian provinces exceeds trade across Prussian 
borders by roughly 66% before WWI and still 50% after WWI. Similarly, there is a divide 
between east and west., which is defined to run from Mecklenburg over Brandenburg to 
Thuringia. Assuming a uniform elasticity of substitution of five, crossing this internal border 
implies paying a tariff-equivalent of 11% before WWI and still 6.5% after WWI. Taken 
together, the results indicate that Germany experienced economic integration between 1885 
and 1933 together with quite massive external economic disintegration. Moreover, all these 
effects were apparently stronger for trade on railways than for trade on waterways. This might 
be a hint that railways are to a larger extend subject to biasing infrastructural and tariff 
policies than waterways (e.g. since the Congress of Vienna there were attempts to liberalize 
waterways, partly successful, see Napp-Zinn 1928).  
 
  In table 2 we neglect the cross-border trade flows to focus on the internal economic 
geography of the Kaiserreich. This also allows us to look at the effects of religious and ethnic 
fragmentation, for which the information outside of the Kaiserreich would not be fully 
comparable. First note that within Germany the effects of distance are somewhat smaller than 
in the full sample, which indicates an integration effect additional to the two  effects 
mentioned above. Next, for the German sample, the Zollverein-variable turns out to be highly 
significant, but with the “wrong” sign. Trade between early members of the Zollverein was 
significantly lower in the 1880s through 1933 than trade between members and non-members. 
This suggests that there may have been some factors influencing German trade flows that we 
did not yet take into account. A look at the map shows that these factors are seaports. The   16 
latecomers in the Zollverein were the northern parts of Germany, especially the port-cites of 
Bremen and Hamburg, but also the area around the important seaport of Emden. Similar to the 
east-west divide between the several industrial clusters of Germany that developed based on 
the availability of mineral resources, especially energy resources (coal), there was an axis of 
very intense trade relations in north-south: this trade was in the main part trade between 
industrial centres of production and seaports, i.e. imports of raw-material and semi-finished 
products and exports of coal and industrial products. The last column in table 2 shows that 
this north-south trade creating factors were more important on waterways than on railways. 
Hence, the European east-west divide has within Germany a mirror in north-south linkages. 
Importantly, the east-west divide is not significant on waterways from 1913 onwards. This 
probably reflects the effect of the new canal connection from Dortmund to the east, which 
was opened in 1899 and showed a tremendous development after that (see Kunz 1995, also 
Napp-Zinn 1928). That is, waterways tended to connect east and west more than railways. 
Moreover, there is evidence that trade within the administrative borders of Prussia continued 
to exceed trade across her borders, but decreasing over time. Finally, while neither religious 
nor ethnic differences apparently played a major role in Germany until 1913 – there is no 
evidence of a “Kulturkampf-effect” based on the Kaiserreich-sample – we do find a strong 
treatment effect of the new borders after 1919. Not surprisingly, the new borders separating 
Alsace and Lorraine in the West and Western Poland in the East from Germany  had a 
significant effect on trade flows. But note that this effect again differed for trade on railways 
and trade on waterways: the effect was much stronger for trade on railways. An additional 
analysis (table 2, last column) shows that the effect differed between the two regions. While 
Western Poland was already before WWI badly integrated into the Kaiserreich, this was not 
true for Alsace-Lorraine. Accordingly, while in both cases the separation from Germany had a 
significant and negative treatment effect, this effect was much stronger in the case of Alsace-
Lorraine than in the case of Western Poland.  
 
  Table 3 gives results based on commodity groups. We focus the analysis on trade on 
railways, in order to include the year 1885 and to make sure that differences between the 
goods are not due to differences in the choice of transportation mode. First we see that 
treating the different commodities separately helps to increase the fit of the model. There also 
seem to be – not surprisingly – large differences in distance-related transport costs and other 
barriers to trade across commodity groups. However, any comparison needs to take into 
account that there might be large differences in commodity-specific elasticities of substitution   17 
(see Evans 2003, Wolf 2005). If we take the benchmark estimates from Evans (2003) for 
good-specific elasticities, the estimated distance related trade barrier is largest for hard coal, 
followed by iron and steel products, brown coal, rye, paper and lowest for chemical products. 
This makes sense in terms of value to weight ratios, which are highest for chemical products 
and usually lowest for mineral products. The pattern of internal borders is roughly similar 
across all these commodity groups, namely there is some evidence of an intra-Prussian border 
and quite massive evidence for an east-west border as well as a north-south axis of intense 
trade. Given differences in elasticities, especially trade flows in hard- and brown coal but also 
all other industrial products (such as the energy intensive paper and chemical products) show 
this east-west divide, but not rye. The tariff equivalents of the east-west divide developed for 
the various commodity groups between 1885 and 1933 as follows:  hard coal (38%, 36%), 
brown coal (77%, 38%), iron and steel (22%, 16%), chemical products (13%, 21%), paper 
and related products (19%, 10%), and rye (18%, 0%).  Note the increase for chemical 
products, but the disappearance of the effect for rye. Hence, products which are independent 
from the availability of energy resources  are less affected by this i nternal border. If we 
consider the last rows of table 3, we see that for all products there was a large treatment effect 
of the new outer borders of Germany after the Versailles treaty in 1919. For example, based 
on the Evans (2003) estimates for elasticities of substitution, the average tariff equivalent of 
the new borders for Iron and Steel products in 1925 was 437% (!), for chemical products it 
was 88%, for rye it was 117 %. In 1933 these trade barriers were still extremely high but had 
declined somewhat (364%, 79%, 53% respectively).   
 
  Finally, let us consider table 4, where we restrict the sample to include only trade 
districts within the borders of Germany today. Overall, the results are quite similar to the 
results from tables 2 and 3, with the exception that there is now also evidence of a religious 
divide affecting domestic trade: German Catholics and Protestants apparently do have some 
tradition to stay apart. But more interestingly, we still see a quite large east-west divide as 
well as evidence for significantly above average trade relations in north-south direction. This 
might be surprising for those who use to relate differences between the German East and the 
West to differences in the level of overall economic development. Here, we argue that part of 
the story is a lack of economic integration that is probably due to the development of 
industrial centres based on spatially separated mineral resources. The industries of Berlin and 
Saxony depended much more on coal and ore from eastern regions than on resources from the 
west, while the Ruhr industry was obviously little affected by the availability of coal in distant   18 
regions. However, consider the difference between railways and waterways as already noted 
above (table 2). The effect on railways is much stronger than for the pooled sample, hence 
indicating that waterways had a counteracting impact. This is probably due to the opening of 
the first part of the large east-west canal project “Mittellandkanal” in 1899,  and the 
subsequent extensions, finished until 1916. If we look at railways alone and drop all other 
variables except the east-west divide, which coincides in the case of the Germany 1991 
sample with the future border between GDR and FRG, we see that still in 1933 there was a 
significant internal border. If we assume an average elasticity of substitution of 3, the implied 
tariff equivalent of this border changed from 23% in 1885 to 14% in 1933. Hence, there was a 
lot of progress in terms of east-west economic integration from the Kaiserreich to the end of 
the Weimar Republic, but Germany was still far from an economic unity.   
 
VI. Conclusion and outlook 
 
This paper was a first attempt to put the debate about Germany’s economic unification 
in an historical long run perspective. The aim was to answer two related questions: how did 
the economic integration of Germany evolve over time? And what was the effect of changing 
political borders on economic integration, compared to other lines of fragmentation (cultural, 
geographic)? In short, there was a lot of evidence that Germany experienced a process of 
economic integration across old borders such as inherited political and administrative borders 
or cultural divides between Catholics and Protestants. However, m ost important were the 
effects of some internal east-west divide that was much more present on railways than on 
waterways and can be traced back to the emergence of 19
th century industrial clusters around 
regions rich in mineral resources. Together with the natural  geography of waterways which 
mostly flow in north-south rather than east-west direction and probably intensified by the long 
history of Germany’s political fragmentation this resulted in two economically disintegrated 
parts of Germany. During the Kaiserreich and later the Weimar Republic, the effect of this 
internal border declined  – probably due to improvements in infrastructure such as the 
construction of the “Mittellandkanal”    -  but it never disappeared.  Hence, the process of 
political unification was broadly followed by increasing  economic integration, while some 
internal borders were surprisingly persistent. In line with this, we found a differential effect of 
the post-Versailles borders on trade flows. Both, in the case of Alsace-Lorraine and Western 
Poland the new borders had a significant negative effect on trade flows. But if measured 
against pre-1914 trade integration this “treatment effect” of the new borders was much more   19 
important in the case of Alsace-Lorraine than in the case of Western Poland due to the fact 
that Western  Poland was already before WWI only poorly integrated into the German 
economy.  
 
What are the lessons to be drawn  from this historical case study? First, the German 
case shows once again that political integration can foster economic integration through a 
multitude of possible channels. Infrastructure that connects previously separated regions is 
probably one of the most important factors. Second, natural geography such as the 
combination of natural transport ways with the availability of mineral resources might put 
some constraints on integration that are hard to overcome. Obviously, to what extent such a 
natural barrier to economic integration implies a loss of welfare would depend on the 
structure of demand across a country (see Evans 2003). But this very  high persistence of 
internal disintegration certainly provides a new and less demanding benchmark for Germany’s 
economic integration today. Third, in order to assess the effects of changing political borders 
on the economy properly, one needs to estimate the “treatment effect” of the new border, 
controlling for potential idiosyncratic variations in bilateral trade flows that are not time-
dependent. Doing so, one finds in the case of the new borders between Alsace-Lorraine and 
Germany and Western Poland and  Germany that  already before WWI  integration varied 
significantly, and so did the “treatment effect” of the new borders. This qualifies the many 
statements about the disastrous effects of changing borders on the European economy in the 
wake of Versailles (for example Pollard 1981). It also helps to assess the prospects of future 
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Table 1: All Trade Flows, 1885-1933, Tobit, dep. var.: ln(trade), z-stat in parentheses, bold letters indicate significance at 10% 
or better 












Constant  13.750 (44.361)  16.230 (53.165)  15.036 (32.858)  17.305 (38.422)  12.542 (29.570)  15.131 (36.503) 
Log(distance)  -1.689 (-32.508)  -2.025 (-38.962)  -1.939 (-25.898)  -2.247 (-30.267)  -1.453 (-20.273)  -1.789 (-24.776) 
Reich_in  1.577 (7.237)  2.284 (10.482)  09.31 (2.677)  1.422 (4.153)  2.078 (7.237)  2.982 (10.032) 
Prussia_in  0.433 (4.813)  0.483  (5.409)  0.501  (3.867)  0.581 (4.554)  0.416 (3.340)  0.450 (3.608) 
East-West  -0.413  (-7.935)  -0.475  (-9.035)  -0.525  (-6.889)  -0.568  (-7.458)  -0.316 (-4.434)  -0.393 (-5.446) 
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Table 2: Reich in 1913 Borders, 1885-1933, Tobit, dep. var.: ln(trade), z-stat in parentheses, bold letters indicate significance 
at 10% or better 
 
  Period  Pooled   Pooled 
Railways 
Time Varying  Time Var. Railways  Time Var. 
Waterways 
“treatment 
effects” of new 
borders 




16.016 (42.357)  18.772 (53.173)  11.321 (11.977)  16.048 (42.556) 
1885  -1.900 (-17.149)  -2.272 (-21.111)  -  -1.949 (-21.133) 
1913  -1.773 (-17.321)  -2.085 (-21.537)  -0.852 (-3.471)  -1.807 (-20.516) 










-1.612 (-15.677)  -1.854 (-17.970)  -0.779 (-3.495)  -1.546 (-17.493) 
1885  0.749 (3.379)  0.486 (2.212)  -  0.878 (3.989) 
1913  0.163 (0.766)  0.367 (1.783)  -0.679 (-1.150)  0.304 (1.420) 










0.386 (1.843)  0.396 (1.875)  0.268 (0.475)  0.276 (1.309) 
1885  -0.868 (-6.419)  -0.703 (-5.245)  -  -0.843 (-6.507) 
1913  -0.463 (-3.957)  -0.808 (-6.806)  -0.333 (-0.826)  -0.425 (-3.736) 










-0.245 (-2.031)  -0.496 (-3.929)  -0.271 (-0.797)  -0.292 (-2.458) 
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Table 2 (continued) 
1885  -0.274 (-1.075)  -0.566 (-2.253)  -  0.019 (0.073) 
1913  -1.004 (-3.991)  -0.403 (-1.700)  -1.561 (-2.998)  -0.718 (-2.744) 










-0.709 (-2.942)  -0.238 (-0.957)  -1.853 (-3.742)  -1.003 (-4.056) 
1885  -0.429 (-1.330)  -0.010 (-0.033)  -  -0.367 (-1.159) 
1913  0.038 (0.152)  -0.294 (-1.117)  0.276 (0.367)  0.106 (0.429) 










0.212 (0.763)  -0.009 (-0.032)  -0.319 (-0.424)  0.199 (0.718) 
1885  -0.361 (-0.441)  -0.896 (-1.122)  -  - 
1913  -0.339 (-0.435)  -0.765 (-1.008)  -1.021 (-1.726)  - 











-1.647 (-2.017)  -2.685 (-3.359)  -0.574 (-0.951)  - 
1885+1913  -  -  -  -  -  -0.235 (-0.835)  Alsace& 
Lorraine  1925+1933  -  -  -  -  -  -2.443 (-6.655) 
1885+1913  -  -  -  -  -  -0.953 (-3.486)  Western 




  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Adj. R2    0.321  0.461  0.324  0.461  0.177     26 
Table 3: Reich in 1913 borders, 1885-1933, Railways only, Commodity Groups, Tobit, dep. var.: ln(trade), z-stat in 
parentheses, bold letters indicate significance at 10% or better 
 
  Period  Hardcoal  Browncoal  Iron&Steel  Chemicals  Paper etc.  Rye 
Constant  26.648 (23.748)  20.986 (15.694)  17.952 (34.856)  15.865 (30.120)  16.036 (38.355)  23.858 (31.395) 
1885  -3.675 (-11.900)  -2.117 (-5.227)  -2.333 (-14.370)  -1.876 (-12.472)  -2.138 (-15.962)  -3.504 (-15.462) 
1913  -3.300 (-9.884)  -2.285 (-6.320)  -1.945 (-13.345)  -1.806 (-13.595)  -1.959 (-17.517)  -3.593 (-18.547) 
1925  -2.811 (-9.748)  -1.381 (-3.853)  -1.791 (-13.396)  -1.322 (-8.565)  -1.650 (-12.959)  -2.624 (-12.806) 
Log(distance) 
1933  -2.753 (-8.573)  -1.466 (-3.502)  -1.932 (-13.703)  -1.473 (-9.944)  -1.577 (-13.523)  -3.509 (-16.613) 
1885  0.629 (0.689)  -1.262 (-1.359)  0.662 (1.718)  0.377 (1.215)  0.331 (1.202)  0.618 (1.217) 
1913  1.511 (1.691)  0.266 (0.312)  0.458 (1.438)  0.184 (0.729)  0.488 (2.089)  0.638 (1.423) 
1925  -1.036 (-1.362)  -0.522 (-0.573)  0.506 (1.762)  0.109 (0.346)  0.720 (2.941)  0.425 (0.991) 
Prussia_in 
1933  0.603 (0.719)  0.261 (0.264)  0.442 (1.439)  0.427 (1.487)  0.599 (2.690)  0.337 (0.715) 
1885  -0.866 (-1.655)  -1.540 (-3.486)  -0.418 (-1.813)  -0.477 (-2.806)  -0.674 (-3.455)  -0.783 (-2.395) 
1913  -1.473 (-3.185  -1.401 (-2.807)  -0.631 (-3.438)  -0.793 (-5.057)  -1.036 (-7.435)  -0.254 (-1.021) 
1925  -0.417 (-1.060)  -1.346 (-2.801)  -0.276 (-1.761)  -0.594 (-3.837)  -0.395 (-2.906)  -0.007 (-0.025) 
East-West 
1933  -0.839 (-1.586)  -0.873 (-1.670)  -0.304 (-1.813)  -0.785 (-4.461)  -0.381 (-3.105)  -0.313 (-1.116) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
    Hardcoal  Browncoal  Iron&Steel  Chemicals  Paper etc.  Rye 
1885  -0.103 (-0.121)  -2.672 (-3.010)  -0.293 (-0.695)  -1.217 (-3.318)  -0.427 (-1.268)  -0.441 (-0.708) 
1913  -1.341 (-1.686)  -1.137 (-1.308)  -0.683 (-1.716)  -0.307 (-1.014)  -0.262 (-0.965)  -0.163 (-0.310) 
1925  -0.824 (-1.173)  -1.818 (-2.068)  0.587 (1.462)  0.427 (1.010)  1.104 (3.148)  -1.289 (-2.439) 
Zollverein34_in 
1933  -1.514 (-1.800)  -2.395 (-2.245)  -0.179 (-0.435)  -0.385 (-1.065)  0.342 (1.132)  0.859 (1.592) 
1885  1.946 (1.560)  -1.554 (-1.384)  0.069 (0.133)  0.152 (0.411)  -0.363 (-0.944)  -0.301 (-0.503) 
1913  0.462 (0.477)  -2.826 (-2.534)  0.511 (1.277)  -0.163 (-0.562)  -0.148 (-0.476)  -1.222 (-2.297) 
1925  0.967 (1.131)  -0.891 (-0.710)  -0.091 (-0.224)  -0.511 (-1.156)  -0.372 (-0.986)  -0.117 (-0.192) 
Conf. Diff. 
1933  -0.081 (-0.073)  -2.228 (-1.428)  -0.284 (-0.699)  0.255 (0.653)  0.467 (1.512)  -0.873 (-1.293) 
1885  1.034 (0.889)  0.531 (0.345)  -0.957 (-1.473)  -0.911 (-1.409)  -1.033 (-0.973)  -1.299 (-1.456) 
1913  1.894 (1.644)  1.899 (1.464)  -1.540 (-2.530)  -0.140 (-0.325)  -1.351 (-1.317)  -0.373 (-0.606) 








  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Adj. R2    0.412  0.425  0.635  0.693  0.753  0.609 
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Table 4: Trade in borders of Germany 1991, 1885-1933, Tobit, dep. var.: ln(trade), z-stat in parentheses, bold letters indicate 
significance at 10% or better 
 
  Period  Time Varying  Time Var. Railways  Time Var. Railways 
(Distance and East-
West only) 
Constant  15.921 (34.819)  18.477 (44.433)  19.405 (68.809) 
1885  -2.017 (-15.801)  -2.356 (-19.060)  -2.489 (-21.860) 
1913  -1.637 (-12.188)  -1.978 (-16.219)  -2.107 (-18.744) 
1925  -1.302 (-11.650)  -1.639 (-14.758)  -1.801 (-18.010) 
 
Log(distance) 
1933  -1.563 (-13.998)  -1.814 (-14.938)  -1.997 (-17.994) 
1885  1.239 (4.942)  0.899 (3.559)  - 
1913  0.240 (0.942)  0.781 (3.166)  - 
1925  -0.059 (-0.247)  0.235 (1.029)  - 
 
Prussia_in 
1933  0.159 (0.662)  0.271 (1.103)  - 
1885  -0.730 (-5.407)  -0.609 (-3.564)  -0.622 (-4.048) 
1913  -0.002 (-0.713)  -0.455 (-2.763)  -0.604 (-4.316) 




1933  0.108 (0.183)  -0.238 (-1.587)  -0.393 (-2.690) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
1885  0.345 (1.103)  -0.238 (-0.784)  - 
1913  -1.016 (-3.029)  0.229 (0.794)  - 
1925  -0.953 (-3.060)  -0.048 (-0.184)  - 
Zollverein34_in 
1933  -0.905 (-3.122)  -0.200 (-0.685)  - 
1885  -0.784 (-1.667)  -0.428 (-0.919)  - 
1913  -0.747 (-1.724)  -0.939 (-1.976)  - 
1925  -0.973 (-2.364)  -0.638 (-1.459)  - 
Conf. Diff. 
1933  -0.641 (-1.533)  -1.001 (-2.203)  - 
Time varying 
location dummies 
  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R2    0.312  0.479  0.476 
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